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Introduction: Continuity and Change in Russian Culture 
Dmitri Shalin 
 
This project on Russian culture goes back to the Spring of 1990 when 
several American and Russian scholars converged at the Russian Research 
Center at Harvard University and decided to join forces in a study of 
changes sweeping the Soviet Union. From the start, the participants 
agreed that they would not try to chase fast breaking news from Russia -- 
a hopeless task given the pace of recent changes, but rather would focus 
on the continuity and change in Russian culture, on the long-term social 
forces that compel the Russian people to reexamine old ways and 
reevaluate old values. 
We divided the labor in such a way that each participant could center on 
one cultural domain -- religious, artistic, intellectual, political, economic, 
etc. The borders demarcating each domain under study are not meant to 
be sharp. The map of Russian culture we have drawn is admittedly 
arbitrary. But we believe that our survey is comprehensive enough to give 
the reader some insight into Russian culture, the key junctures in its 
historical development, and the momentous transformations it has been 
undergoing in recent years. 
Our project is interdisciplinary. It pulls together the resources of the 
humanities and social sciences, which increases the chance for cross-
fertilization in the fields whose practitioners often lose sight of what is 
going on in neighboring disciplines. Our team includes literary and cinema 
critics, historians, philosophers, psychologists, sociologists, and political 
scientists. The participants rely on a wide range of methods, including 
personal interviews, analysis of Soviet literature, cinema, and fine arts, as 
well as opinion surveys. We proceed on the assumption that humanists 
and social scientists have a lot to learn from each other, that sociological 
surveys illuminate relationships crying for fresh interpretations and 
humanistic insights open new vistas inviting further sociological probing. 
Scholars working on this project met in Las Vegas on November 19-20, 
1992, for the Nevada Conference on Soviet Culture. The occasion afforded 
the intellectuals raised in vastly different cultures an opportunity to reflect 
on their biases, enrich each other's perspective, and set up a framework 
for future collaboration. We plan to follow up this study with three more 
conferences and volumes that would explore in depth artistic, political, 
and economic realms in Russian culture. Meanwhile, we offer the papers 
presented at the conference to our colleagues, students, and the general 
public interested in Russia and its uncertain future. 
The remainder of this introductory essay focuses on several sticky 
methodological issues and substantive difficulties facing students of 
culture in general and Russian culture in particular. This is not an attempt 
to settle the problems vexing cultural studies experts, as much as an 
attempt to spell out assumptions undergirding our collective undertaking. 
* * * * 
The vast literature on Russia has numerous references to culture. Each 
time this term is invoked, it acquires a somewhat different meaning, 
depending on whether the researcher is dealing with Russian culture, 
Bolshevik culture, Soviet culture, post-Soviet culture, and so on. [1] In 
the broadest sense, the term refers to an enduring configuration of 
thoughts, actions, and institutions that distinguishes people inhabiting a 
given socio-historical nitche. Yet, there is always some ambiguity involved 
in the rhetoric of culture as to how enduring the pattern in question is, 
how much local diversity it allows, and how far a given variation has to 
stray from the main theme before it becomes a cultural theme in its own 
right. There is also a nagging concern that the values and beliefs people 
express verbally do not always match the preferences and commitments 
they reveal in their overt conduct. Finally, it is not altogether clear 
whether high culture -- literature, theology, political critique, philosophical 
treatises, and other highly stylized forms of public discourse -- give us a 
reliable insight into behavior and lifestyles of society at large, especially 
when it comes to groups that do not consume high culture and are more 
attuned to popular culture. 
In its extreme form, cultural determinism encourages one to string vastly 
diverse social facts on a single conceptual cord and to look for a cultural 
continuity impervious to historical change. Thus, Nikolai Berdiaev 
[2] discerns in Russian history "spiritual ailments that could not be cured 
by any external social reforms and revolutions," personality traits that 
"belong to the metaphysical character of the Russian people and manifest 
themselves in the Russian revolution." The grotesque characters that 
Nikolai Gogol pictured in his famous stories, Berdiaev is convinced, "are 
not phenomena generated by the old regime, by certain social and 
political causes; quite to the contrary -- [these characters] have informed 
the regime's political and social forms, determined all that was bad in this 
regime." 
Where Berdiaev sees a seamless line between pre- and post-revolutionary 
Russia , Alexander Solzhenitsyn envisions a dramatic break: "[T]he 
transition from pre-October Russia to the U.S.S.R. is no continuation but a 
deadly break of the spinal cord which nearly resulted in the nation's death. 
Soviet history does not continue the Russian evolution but perverts the 
latter, pushing the country in a new, unnatural direction inimical to the 
nation's past. . . . The terms "Russian" and "Soviet," " Russia " and "the 
U.S.S.R." are neither interchangeable nor contiguous -- these are polar 
notions which completely exclude one another." [3] 
These extreme views have one thing in common: a cultural determinism 
that hampers an inquiry into the continuity and change and stalls efforts 
to understand how the interplay between tradition and structural 
transformation has been shaping Russian culture. Such an over-
determined view often results in attempts to decipher an immutable code 
enciphered into the national character and informing the nation's past, 
present, and future. Witness the research tradition that sought to 
articulate a "modal personality," "attitude set," "national character," and 
other transhistorical cultural formations designed to explain every turn in 
a particular nation's history. [4] 
The same logic fuelled the debate about Russia 's relation to the West and 
the East. Recall the long-standing dispute between Slavophiles and 
Westernizers which failed to settle the question of whether Russian culture 
belongs to the European civilization or embodies Byzantine values. The 
same issues dominated Eurasionist theories about the link between the 
Russians and people populating Far Eastern and Central Asian regions. 
This controversy was echoed in the Bolshevik writings and is evident in 
Lunacharsky's contention that "we, communists, even back then when we 
were called social democrats, to say nothing of our predecessors like 
Chernyshevsky and his spiritual brethren, always were Westernizers. . . . 
you've got to understand that our communism is an offspring of the 
West." [5] This interminable discourse on whether Russia is the Western-
most frontier of Asian civilization or the Eastern-most flank of Occidental 
culture glosses over the complexities of lived history and seems 
particularly dated when the ex-communists have forged an unholy alliance 
with ultra-nationalists in post-Soviet Russia . 
Lets not forget, however, that some Russian thinkers have spurned 
sweeping generalizations about their country's cultural patterns. As 
Dostoyevsky put it, "all our slavophilism and westernism is but one great 
confusion, albeit a necessary one." [6] "Should we blame our national 
character?," queried Dobroliubov. "This invocation hardly resolves the 
issue, it only pushes it further back: How did our national character, 
passive and weak as it is, evolve? We are simply forced to move the 
deliberation from the present onto a historical plane." [7] 
In this spirit, we have resisted the temptation to collapse unwieldy 
historical particulars into an overarching theoretical scheme. At the same 
time, we did not rule out a judicious look into transhistorical patterns 
informing Russian culture. To discern the contours of Russia 's future, we 
must try to disentangle the forms indigenous to Soviet culture from those 
going back to pre-revolutionary times and the fledgling patterns coming 
into being right now. 
We share our starting premise with those students of Soviet society who 
believe that a "genuine understanding of events in the Soviet Union must 
incorporate both density of detail and a historical perspective." [8] Our 
volume opens up with chapters focusing on the historical forces that 
shaped Soviet culture, the evolution of beliefs, values, and action patterns 
in key cultural spheres, and the internal contradictions peculiar to each 
cultural area. Then, the authors move to the transformation that various 
cultural spheres underwent during the perestroika years and beyond. In 
each of these domains we have witnessed a far-reaching reconstruction 
punctuated by the conflict between the taken-for-granted values and the 
new, often confusing, precepts brought forth by reform. We proceed on 
the assumption that reforming society is impossible without reforming its 
members' consciousness, that macro-institutional changes must be 
translated into the ways people think, feel, and act, if these changes are 
to endure. Our emphasis, therefore, is on the beliefs, attitudes, and 
values behind new ways of doing things, on the changes in personal and 
group orientations insofar as these are reflected in mass consciousness 
and expert-elite cultures and find their expression in opinion polls, the 
popular press, literary magazines, and personal conversations. 
In theoretical terms, we take our inspiration from an interpretive tradition 
that gives the human spirit a center place in scholarly narrative. [9] Our 
outlook on culture owes much to Max Weber who, in Clifford Geertz's 
graphic words, taught us that "man is the animal suspended in the webs 
of significance he himself has spun." [10] This precept calls for special 
attention to the sense people make of their own life situation, their 
professed beliefs, values, and meaningful actions. We view humans as 
self-conscious beings, "as characters in enacted narratives," [11] or 
individuals bent on choosing their own narrative system and narrating 
their own lives. Time and place may severely constrain individual choice, 
but structural constraints can not extinguish the quest for a more viable 
system of values and a better life style. 
Although human understandings form a system, the latter is never devoid 
of inconsistencies and contradictions. In cultural domains, "pluralism is 
common, inconsistency is pervasive and syncretism is general practice." 
[12] For students of Soviet culture, this insight is signally important, for it 
highlights conflicts endemic to the system of values supported by official 
Soviet culture. In decades before perestroika, these conflicts were 
submerged. As time went by, they grew more visible, the gap between 
official values and everyday reality became more tangible, and a double 
life -- one for official consumption and one for the inner circle of trusted 
friends -- increasingly intolerable. We fully appreciate what Gellner 
[13] calls "the social role of absurdity." In the years immediately 
preceding Gorbachev's reforms, this absurdity manifested itself in 
pervasive disenchantment, ironic detachment, mockery of official cultural 
norms, and other nonconformist gestures that exposed official hypocrisy 
and hinted at an autonomous agent behind the official role, an 
irrepressible private self ready to burst out and subvert the official grand 
narrative. [14] 
We take issue with those who believe that there is "no 'usable past' in 
Russian thought," [15] who are inclined to view the Soviet era as Russian 
culture's Dark Ages. A similar attitude prevailed among Enlightenment 
philosophers who passed the harsh judgment on the European Middle 
Ages as a period hopelessly marred by human waste and spiritual 
stagnation. The romantic successors to the Enlightenment cast a more 
ambivalent glance at the period, which was colored in part by the growing 
awareness that capitalism and modernity brought in their wake 
deprivations and horrors all their own. To pass judgment on Soviet 
civilization means not only to stigmatize its many failures but also to bring 
to the fore its hidden graces. 
We need to understand why so many talented painters, writers, and poets 
placed their names on the revolutionary masthead; how Block, Malevich, 
Mayakovsky, Eisenstein, and scores of other artists managed to produce 
lasting works of art; what is there in the totalitarian environment that 
nourishes friendship and creativity; which are this era's undeniable, even 
if perverted, gains that have to be surrendered in a freer, democratic, 
market oriented society of the future. Yes, Soviet art helped prop up the 
Bolshevik regime, but it also engendered works that through their very 
aesthetic qualities undermined the legitimacy of Soviet power. Why else 
would Soviet artists face such relentless persecution from the authorities? 
After all, Soviet society produced not only Zhdanov , Makarenko, Lysenko, 
Kozhevnikov, Markov but also Losev, Shostakovich, Sukhomlinsky, 
Sakharov, Liubimov, Avertinsev and many other cultural figures whose 
personal courage and creative accomplishments cannot be denied. 
Whatever lofty aspirations and momentous transcendences found in 
Soviet society deserve to be salvaged for our memories. 
We also want to stress that the recent reforms in Russia by no means 
embody a uniform progress. Perestroika did not free cultural life in the 
Soviet Union from contradiction. "Societies do not necessarily move from 
one type or stage to another in an 'upward ever, backward never 
fashion'." [16] Far from that, Soviet reforms have set in motion fresh 
conflicts and bred new ironies. "Paradoxically," writes Eklof, [17] "glasnost 
may be vital to perestroika; but it may also be its undoing." The same 
goes for many hard fought freedoms in Russia . A Soviet artist may be 
free today to follow his creative instincts, but he is also relieved from the 
state subsidies that used to support his art. A Soviet entrepreneur can 
now set up his own business, but he has to deal with ambiguous laws, 
face hostile customers, and ruthless racketeers. A dissident, accustomed 
to the role of an outside critic, now finds himself in a position of authority 
where he has to deliver on earlier promises. Contradictions and ironies is 
the stuff of which social change is made, and we have tried to give them 
full treatment in our study. 
Nor should our premises be taken to mean that culture exists in a 
vacuum, that it informs without being informed. All cultures are embedded 
in historical contexts and are constrained by social, economic, and political 
structures which inhibit or facilitate social change. The point is rather that 
cultural rhetoric matters, that each culture has a logic of its own, that any 
attempt to manipulate values and subject culture to a legislative dictate 
are bound to misfire, as many revolutionary regimes have discovered. The 
line separating substance and style, rhetoric and reality, attitudes and 
behavior, meaning and structure is never too sharp in matters of cultural 
politics. Style is not some sort of wrapping that could be readily replaced, 
nor is substance akin to wine that could be poured into a new container 
with its properties intact. There is no such thing as styleless substance 
any more than there is substanceless style. When people forgo old 
rhetoric and switch to a new cultural narrative, they undermine the status 
quo and weaken established structures. Gorbachev has learned it the hard 
way when his rhetoric of glasnost went far beyond his original plan to 
update the cumbersome Soviet system. The same goes for Solzhenitsyn: 
once he declared that "ugly methods multiply in ugly results," [18] he had 
little choice but to disavow Zhirinovsky and ultra-nationalists whose 
venomous rhetoric and hatred toward "alien elements" are sabotaging 
serious efforts at social reconstruction in Russia. 
Our focus on discursive forms does not conflate cultural narrative with 
social life in its totality, it does not cast verbal culture as a primary 
causative factor in social evolution; rather, it reflects our contention that 
public discourse, in both its high and popular culture forms, feeds into 
reality just as it takes into itself and continuously articulates the ongoing 
social transformation. 
In sum, we view culture as action steeped in narrative, drenched in 
emotions, informed by common needs, grounded in institutional discourse 
that serves to legitimize our public conduct and justify our action to 
ourselves and to others. [19] From which it follows that attitudes and 
conduct belong to one continuum, that values are to be understood as 
verbal behavior, action at a slice, while conduct is to be seen as stand-
taking, a succession of attitudes displayed for the purpose of legitimizing 
oneself to others and to one's own selves. Correlatively, national character 
transpires here not as a psychological structure formed at some early 
point in a nation's history and determining immutable personality traits 
but a semiotic or narrative structure comprised by roles, scenarios, 
behavioral strategies, and emotional attitudes which could be invoked or 
deployed on a particular occasion to legitimize the chosen course of action 
but which do not preclude the situational and historical transcendence of 
the established cultural forms. Far from being a set of hidden values, 
sacred texts, socialization practices, and behavioral patterns enciphered in 
a code that foreordains the historical process, culture is a multitextual, 
polivocal, inherently contradictory affair that leaves ample room for choice 
and creativity, personal commitment and responsibility. Throughout this 
volume, we have tried to demonstrate that there is a choice to be made 
and responsibility to be claimed by those who have to grapple with 
Russian culture at this critical historical juncture. Russian culture is at the 
crossroads; its future depends in large measure on the choices that its 
agents will make in years to come. To be sure, the cataclysmic break with 
the past we have witnessed in Russia in the last decade cannot be 
directed and controlled from above. It produces unanticipated 
consequences, stirs conflicts, and breeds deviant conduct -- a pattern 
well-known to students of social change. Underlying this pattern is what 
Durkheim [20] called "anomie" -- the situation where old norms no longer 
apply but new ones are too vague and problematic to command universal 
assent. As numerous accounts attest, [21] behavioral changes in 
revolutionary times are accompanied by a cognitive restructuring that sets 
new standards of valuation and breeds the feeling of moral malaise. What 
people in Russia are discovering is that the system is encrypted in their 
selves, that it cannot be turned on and off at will. Bred into people's bones 
for seventy-odd years, Soviet culture is bound to persist for some time 
after the coercive structures supporting it have crumbled. It would be 
naive to believe that our efforts to illuminate Russian culture could have 
any discernable impact on its course. But to the extent that our study 
facilitates the Russian people's efforts to come to grips with its past 
traumatic experiences, it might make cultural change in Russia less 
painful for those who have to live it through. 
While our project attends to an unfinished revolution and deals with 
history in the making, it has something to offer to the humanities' and 
social sciences' timeless mission. Perestroika in Russian culture is a story 
of the human spirit in distress. It tells us about peoples trapped in history, 
sucked into a system they despise, yet unsure of the way out. If progress 
to-date has been disappointing, it is not necessarily because the reformers 
have charted a wrong course. It took one day for the Israelites to exit 
Egypt , forty years to reach the promised land. An entirely new generation 
had to come into its own, one unschooled in the old ways and raised in a 
new culture, before the Israelites managed to leave their gloomy past 
behind. Russian reforms represent the quest for a new culture in which 
several generations take part but which will bear fruit for generations to 
come. This may be a local history but its lessons are universal, its 
significance reaches far beyond Russia , and it is our hope that it can 
teach us about our values, cultures, and the human predicament. 
* * * * 
A few words about those who helped make this study possible is in order 
here. I wish to thank the Harvard University Russian Research Center for 
a research fellowship that allowed me to spend my 1989-1990 sabbatical 
year at the Center and afforded many a fruitful encounter with its 
members, whose advice and friendly criticism helped get this project off 
the ground. Special thanks are extended to the MacArthur Foundation's 
grant that made possible a visit to the U.S. of the Russian project 
participants. We owe a debt of gratitude to the International Research and 
Exchange Board, the Soros Foundation, the Nevada Humanities 
Committee, and the UNLV Foundation which provided partial support for 
the Nevada Conference on Soviet culture. Several Las Vegas businesses -- 
the Tropicana Hotel, the Vista Group, the Nevada Gaming, Inc., Aztec Gas 
and Oil -- pitched in with local accommodations for conference 
participants. This help from the business community for a strictly 
academic enterprise is highly appreciated, particularly at a time when 
federal funding sources for such international projects have largely dried 
up. 
Dr. Yuri Levada, director of the National Center for Public Opinion 
Research, and Dr. Vladimir Yadov, director of the Russian Academy of 
Science Institute of Sociology, have helped facilitate the project on the 
Russian side and accommodated American project participants visiting 
Russia . I want to thank Vladimir Magun, Daniil Dondurei, Zara 
Abdullaeva, Alexander Etkind, and Igor Kon who helped me personally 
navigate through the Russian bureaucracy and engaged me in numerous 
conversations which gave the project its present shape. Finally, I wish to 
thank my wife, Janet S. Belcove-Shalin, for selflessly aiding in my work 
and putting up with my temporary insanity that several years of writing 
proposals, organizing conferences, translating Russian texts, and editing 
the manuscript in its numerous incarnations might have induced in her 
husband. I owe her a debt that could never be repaid in any coin. 
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